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MAKING A MIRACLE1 
BY ROBERT  E.  LUCAS,  JR. 
This  lecture  surveys recent  models  of  growth and trade in search of  descriptions of 
technologies  that are consistent with episodes  of very rapid income growth. Emphasis is 
placed  on  the  on-the-job  accumulation  of  human  capital:  learning  by doing.  Possible 
connections  between  learning rates and international trade are discussed. 
KEYWORDS:  Growth, productivity, on-the-job training, learning. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IN  1960, THE  PHILIPPINES  AND  SOUTH  KOREA  had  about the  same standard of 
living, as measured by their per capita GDPs of about $640 U.S.  1975. The two 
countries were similar in many other respects. There were 28 million people  in 
the Philippines and 25 million in Korea, with slightly over half of both popula- 
tions of working age. Twenty seven  percent  of  Filippino's lived in Manila, 28 
percent of South Koreans in Seoul. In both countries, all boys of primary school 
age were in school,  and almost all girls, but only about a quarter of secondary 
school  age  children were  in school.  Only 5 percent  of  Koreans in their early 
twenties were in college,  as compared to 13 percent in the Philippines. Twenty 
six percent of Philippine GDP was generated  in agriculture, and 28 percent in 
industry. In Korea, the comparable numbers were 37 and 20 percent. Ninety six 
percent  of  Philippine  merchandise  exports  consisted  of  primary commodities 
and 4 percent of manufactured goods. In Korea, primary commodities made up 
86 percent of exports, and manufactured goods 14 (of which 8 were textiles). 
From  1960 to  1988, GDP  per  capita  in  the  Philippines  grew at  about  1.8 
percent  per year, about the  average for per capita incomes  in the world as a 
whole.  In Korea, over the same period, per capita income grew at 6.2 percent 
per year, a rate consistent with the doubling of living standards every 11 years. 
Korean incomes are now similar to Mexican, Portuguese, or Yugoslavian, about 
three times incomes in the Philippines,  and about one  third of incomes in the 
United  States.2 
I  do  not  think it  is  in  any way an exaggeration to  refer to  this  continuing 
transformation of Korean society as a miracle, or to apply this term to the very 
similar transformations that are occurring in Taiwan, Hong  Kong, and Singa- 
pore. Never before  have the  lives of  so many people  (63 million in these  four 
areas in 1980) undergone  so rapid an improvement over so long a period, nor 
(with the tragic exception of Hong Kong) is there any sign that this progress is 
1 Prepared for the 1991 Fisher-Schultz Lecture, given in September at the European meetings of 
the Econometric  Society. I am grateful to Jose  Scheinkman, T. W. Schultz, Nancy Stokey, Alwyn 
Young, and the referees for discussion and criticism. 
2The  figures in the  first paragraph are  taken  from the  1984 World Development Report. The 
income and population figures in this paragraph and the next are from Summers and Heston (1991). 
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near its end. How did it happen? Why did it happen in Korea and Taiwan, and 
not in the Philippines? 
Questions  like  these  can be  addressed  at many levels.  It is useful  to begin 
simply by listing some  of  the  features  of  these  transformations in addition to 
their  income  growth  rates.  All  of  the  East  Asian  miracle  economies  have 
become  large scale  exporters of  manufactured goods  of  increasing sophistica- 
tion. They have become  highly urbanized (no problem for Singapore and Hong 
Kong!) and increasingly well-educated. They have high savings rates. They have 
pro-business governments, following differing mixes of laissez faire and mercan- 
tilist commercial policies.  These  facts-or  at least some of them-must  figure 
in any explanation of the growth miracles, but they are additions to the list of 
events we want to explain, not themselves explanations. 
We want to be able to use these events to help in assessing economic policies 
that may affect growth rates in other countries. But simply advising a society to 
"follow the Korean model" is a little like advising an aspiring basketball player 
to "follow the Michael Jordan model." To make use of someone  else's success- 
ful performance  at any task, one  needs  to be  able to break this performance 
down into its component parts so that one can see what each part contributes to 
the whole, which aspects of this performance are imitable and, of these, which 
are worth imitating. One needs, in short, a theory. 
There has been a great deal of interesting new theoretical research on growth 
and development generally in the last few years, some of it explicitly directed at 
the Asian miracles and much more that seems to me clearly relevant. I will use 
this lecture to try and see what recent research offers toward an explanation for 
these  events.  My review will be  sharply focused  on  neoclassical  theories  that 
view the growth miracles as productivity miracles. What happened over the last 
30 years that enabled the typical Korean or overseas Chinese worker to produce 
6 times the goods and services he could produce in 1960? Indeed, my viewpoint 
will be  even  narrower than the  neoclassical  theories  on which I draw, since  I 
intend to focus on issues of technology, with only cursory treatment of consumer 
preferences  and the nature of product market competition.  There is no doubt 
that the issue of who gets the rewards from innovation is a central one, and it is 
not one that can be resolved on the basis of technological considerations alone, 
so  this narrow focus will necessarily restrict the  conclusions  I will be  able  to 
draw.  But  there  is  no  point  in  trying  to  think  through  hard  questions  of 
industrial organization and general equilibrium without an adequate description 
of the relevant technology, so this seems to me the right place to start. 
I  will  begin  in  Section  2, 'with  a  brief  sketch  of  some  recent  theoretical 
developments and of the image of the world economy these developments offer. 
This image does not, as I see it, admit of anything one could call a miracle, but 
it will be useful in motivating my subsequent emphasis on the accumulation of 
human capital,  and in  particular on  human capital  accumulation on  the job: 
learning by doing. In Section 3, I will review a piece of microeconomic evidence 
on learning and productivity, just to remind you how solid the evidence  is and 
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importance of learning by doing for productivity growth on a specific production 
process is very different from establishing its importance for an entire economy 
as  a  whole,  or  even  for  an  entire  sector.  This  connection  is  much  more 
problematic than I once believed.  But it has been made, in research by Nancy 
Stokey and Alwyn Young, and I will sketch the main technological implications 
of  their work in Section  4. There  is good  reason to believe,  I will argue, that 
something like this technology provided the means for the productivity miracles 
to occur. Section 5 discusses some of the issues involved in developing market 
equilibrium theories  in which  differential learning rates account  for observed 
growth rate differences, and offers some speculations about the implications of 
such a theory for the development prospects of poor countries. Conclusions are 
in Section 6. 
2.  THEORETICAL  BACKGROUND 
There has been a rebirth of confidence-stimulated  in large part by Romer's 
(1986)  contribution-that  explicit  neoclassical  growth models  in  the  style  of 
Solow  (1956)  can  be  adapted  to  fit the  observed  behavior of  rich and  poor 
economies  alike, interacting in a world of international trade. I do not believe 
we  can obtain a theory of economic  miracles in a purely aggregative set-up in 
which every country produces the same, single good (and a rich country is just 
one that produces more of it) but such a framework will be useful in stating the 
problem and in narrowing the theoretical possibilities. 
Consider, to begin with, a single economy that uses physical capital, k(t),  and 
human capital, h(t),  to produce a single good,  y(t): 
(2.1)  y(t)  =Ak(t)  [uh(t)]  1  . 
Here I multiply the human capital input by u, the fraction of time people spend 
producing goods.3 The growth of physical capital depends on the savings rate s: 
dk(t) 
(2.2)  dt=  sy(t), 
while the growth of human capital depends on the  amount of quality-adjusted 
3One  of the referees for this paper found my use of the term "human capital" in this aggregate 
context  idiosyncratic, and I agree that aggrfgate  theorists tend  to use  terms like "technology" or 
"knowledge  capital"  for  what  I  am  here  calling  "human  capital."  But  the  cost  of  having two 
terminologies for discussing the same thing, one  used by microeconomists and another by macroe- 
conomists,  is that it makes it too  easy for one  group to  forget that the other  can be  a source of 
relevant ideas and evidence. 
It was the explicit theme of Schultz (1962) that the theory of human capital, then in its infancy, 
would prove central to  the  theory of  economic  growth, and Schultz included the stock of  human 
capital accumulated on the job in his Table 1 (p. S6). His figures were based on estimates provided 
in Mincer (1962), whose  estimation method  "treats 'learning from experience' as an investment in 
the same sense  as are the more obvious forms of on-the-job training, such as, say, apprenticeship 
programs" (p. S51). My usage in this paper is, I think, consistent with 30 years of practice in labor 
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time devoted to its production: 
dh(t) 
(2.3)  dt  = 8(1  -  u)h(t). 
Taking  the  decision  variables  s  and  u  as  given, which  I  will  do  for  this 
exposition,  the  model  (2.1)-(2.3)  is just  a reinterpretation  of  Solow's  original 
model  of  a single, closed  economy, with the rate of technological  change (the 
average Solow residual) equal to ,.t = 8(1 -  a)(1 -  u) and the initial technology 
level equal to Ah(O)1'a.  In this system, the long run growth rate of both capital 
and production per worker is  8(1 -  u), the rate of human capital growth, and 
the ratio of physical to human capital converges to a constant. In the long run, 
the  level  of  income  is  proportional  to  the  economy's  initial  stock  of  human 
capital.4 
To analyze a world economy made up of countries like this one, one needs to 
be specific about the mobility of factors of production. A benchmark case that 
has the virtues of simplicity and, I think, a decent degree of realism is obtained 
by assuming that labor is completely immobile, while physical capital is perfectly 
mobile.  That is, if there  are n  countries indexed  by i,  assume that the world 
stock  of  physical  capital,  K = Ein_ ki,  is  allocated  across  countries  so  as  to 
equate the marginal product in each country to a common world return, r. Then 
if each country has the technology (2.1) with a common intercept A,  this world 
return is  r = aA(K/H)a-  1, where  H = Yiuihi  is the world supply of effective 
labor devoted  to  goods  production.  Net  domestic  product in  each  country is 
proportional to its effective workforce: 
K  a 
(2.4)  yi=A  H  uihi. 
If everyone has the same constant savings rate s, the dynamics of this world 
economy are essentially the same as those of Solow's model. The world capital 
stock  follows  (dK/dt)  =  sAKaHl  -a,  and  the  time  path  of  H  is  obtained  by 
summing (2.2) over countries, each multiplied by its own time allocation variable 
ui. The long run growth rate of physical capital and of every country's output is 
equal to the growth rate of human capital. Each country's income level will be 
proportional to its initial human capital, not only in the long run but all along 
the equilibrium path. The theory is thus consistent with the permanent mainte- 
nance of any degree of income inequality. 
It would be hard to think of another theory as simple as this one that does a 
better job of fitting the postwar statistics in the back of the World  Development 
Report. By reinterpreting Solow's technology variable as a country-specific stock 
40f  course,  essentially the  same  economics  can be obtained  from a model  in which consumer 
preferences  are taken as given and savings and time  allocation  behavior are derived rather than 
assumed.  See  Uzawa  (1965),  Lucas (1988),  and Caballe and Santos (1991). The  particular model 
sketched  in the  text  is  simply one  rather arbitrarily selected  example  from the  large  number of 
similarly motivated models that have recently been proposed. See, for example, Jones and Manuelli 
(1990), King and Rebelo  (1990), and Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990). MAKING  A  MIRACLE  255 
of human capital, a model that predicts rapid convergence  to common income 
levels is converted into one that is consistent with permanent income inequality. 
But the key assumption on which this prediction is based-that  human capital 
accumulation in any one  economy is independent  of the level of human capital 
in other economies-conflicts  with the evident fact that ideas developed in one 
place spread elsewhere, that there is one frontier of human knowledge, not one 
for each separate economy. Moreover, as Parente and Prescott (1991) observe, 
if the model above is realistically modified to permit each economy to be subject 
to  shocks that have some  independence  across countries, the  assumption that 
each economy undergoes sustained growth due to its own human capital growth 
only would imply ever-growing inequality within any subset of countries. Rela- 
tive income  levels would  follow  random-walk-like behavior. I do  not  see  how 
this prediction can be reconciled with the postwar experience of, say, the OECD 
countries or the EEC. The  countries of  the world are tied  together,  economi- 
cally and technologically, in a way that the model (2.1)-(2.3)  does not capture.5 
One  way  to  introduce  some  convergence  into  the  model  I  have  sketched, 
proposed  and studied by Parente and Prescott (1991), is to modify the human 
capital accumulation technology (2.2) so as to permit any one  country's rate of 
human capital growth to be influenced by the level of human capital elsewhere 
in the world. For example, let H(t)  be the world effective labor variable defined 
above,  and  let  Z(t)  =  H(t)/Eiui  be  the  world  average  human  capital  level. 
Replace  the human capital accumulation equation (2.2) with:6 
(2.5)  dt  = 5(1  -  u)h(t)1Z(t)6. 
dt 
With this modification, the dynamics of the world stocks of physical and human 
capital  are essentially  unchanged,  but now an economy with  a human capital 
stock  lower  than  the  world  average will  grow faster  than  an  above  average 
economy. For example, if the time allocation is equal across countries, so that 
H(t)  and  Z(t)  grow at  the  rate  8(1 -  u),  a country's  relative human capital, 
zi = hi/Z,  follows 
d1 
(2.6)  d-zj(t)  =  5(1  -  u)z(t)[z(t) 
- -1]. 
Evidently,  zi(t)  converges  to  one,  and  from  (2.4),  this  means  that  relative 
incomes converge to one  at the same rate. 
In the world as a whole  in the postwar period, income  dispersion across all 
countries  appears to be  increasing. But, of course,  there  are many reasons to 
believe  that the assumption of free world trade that leads to (2.6) is a very bad 
5An  informative recent  debate  on  income  convergence  has  been  stimulated  by the  exchange 
between  Baumol (1986), De  Long (1988), and Baumol and Wolff (1988). My statement  in the text 
simply echos the shared conclusion of these  authors. 
6 This  external  effect  might  better  be  captured  through the  human capital  level  of  the  most 
advanced countries, rather than the world average Z(t).  But the use of the latter variable keeps the 
algebra simple, and I don't think the distinction is critical for any conclusions I wish to draw here. 256  ROBERT  E.  LUCAS,  JR. 
approximation for much of the world, and there are certainly differences across 
countries  in  the  incentives  people  have  to  accumulate  both  kinds of  capital, 
implying differences in savings rates and the allocation of time. Yet over subsets 
of  countries,  or regions of  countries, where  factor and final goods  mobility is 
high (like the EEC or the 50 U.S.  states) convergence can be observed.7 
Barro and  Sala-i-Martin (1992)  obtain  a regression  estimate  of  an  average 
convergence  rate  of  relative  incomes,  conditioned  on  variables  that  may be 
interpreted as controlling for a country's adherence  to the above assumptions, 
of slightly less than .02 (Table 3, p. 242). As they observe, if one interprets this 
coefficient  as reflecting differential rates of  physical capital accumulation in a 
world  in  which  income  differences  reflect  mainly  differences  in  capital  per 
worker, this rate of convergence is much too low to be consistent with observed 
capital  shares.  Alternatively,  interpreting  this  figure  as  an  estimate  of 
(l/z)(dz/dt)  in (2.6), their estimate  implies  068(1  -  u) = .02. Since  8(1 -  u) is 
the  average  rate  of  human  capital  growth,  also  about  .02  in  reality,  this 
interpretation yields an estimated  0 of unity, which from (2.5) would mean that 
human capital  accumulation  in  any country depends  on  local  effort together 
with worldwide knowledge, independent  of the local human capital level. From 
this viewpoint, the Barro-Sala-i-Martin estimate seems high. 
All of this is by way of a prelude to thinking about growth miracles-about 
deviations from average behavior. I have described a model of a world economy 
reasonably  realistic  in  its  description  of  average  behavior  of  countries  at 
different  income  levels-in  which  everyone  has  the  same  savings  rate  and 
allocates  time  in  the  same  way. What  are  the  prospects  for  using  the  same 
theory to see  how variations across economies  in the parameters s  and u can 
induce variation in behavior of  the  magnitude we  seek  to  explain? Here  the 
exercise begins to get hard. 
The East Asian economies do indeed have high investment rates. The current 
ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP  in Korea is about .29, as compared 
to average behavior of around .22. In Taiwan and Hong Kong, the  investment 
ratios are .21 and .24 respectively. In Singapore, it is a remarkable .47. In the 
Philippines, for comparison it is .18.8 In a world with the perfect capital mobility 
used in my illustration above, these  differences in investment rates would have 
no  connection  with  savings rates:  any country's higher  than  average  savings 
would simply be invested abroad. Even with no international capital mobility, to 
translate a given difference in savings rates into a differences in output growth 
rates one must multiply by the return on capital (since 
a  1 dy  d  1 dy dk  ay 
ds  y  dt  ds  y dk  dt  dk 
7See,  for example, Ben-David (1991). 
8All  the  figures cited  are  for  1984. The  ratio for Taiwan  is  from the  1987 Taiwan  National 
Income.  The others are from the 1986 World  Development  Report. MAKING  A  MIRACLE  257 
from (2.2)). If the  return on capital were  ten percent,  then,  the Korea-Philip- 
pines  investment rate difference of  .11 can account for a difference of  .011 in 
output  growth rates,  or  about one  percentage  point.  Even  this  effect  is  only 
transient, since in the long run differences in savings rates are level effects only. 
Now applying the same rough calculation to the Singapore-Philippines invest- 
ment rate difference of  .29, one can account for a difference in output growth 
rates of nearly three percentage points (and more, if a higher and still defensi- 
ble  return on  capital  is used)  which  is close  to  the  differentials I  am calling 
"miraculous.?'  Indeed, Young (1992) demonstrates that output growth in Singa- 
pore since the 1960's can be accounted for entirely by growth in conventionally 
measured  capital  and labor inputs, with  nothing left  over to be  attributed to 
technological change. But Young's point, underscored by his parallel treatment 
of Singapore and Hong Kong, is the exceptional character of growth in Singa- 
pore,  and not  that the  Asian  miracles in general can be  attributed to  capital 
accumulation. 
Growth accounting methods, applied country-by-country as in Young's study, 
can quantify the role of  investment differentials in accounting for growth rate 
differences. In general, these  differentials leave most measured output growth 
to be  explained by other forces. This conclusion, which seems  to me  so clear, 
remains controversial. Correlations between investment ratios and growth rates, 
which  tend  to  be  positive,  are frequently cited  but  do  not  settle  anything. If 
growth is  driven by  rapid  accumulation  of  human  capital,  one  needs  rapid 
growth in physical capital just to keep up: look at equation (2.4)! It may be that 
by excluding physical capital  from  the  human capital  accumulation  equation 
(2.3)  or  (2.5)  I  have  ruled  out  some  interesting  possibilities:  One  cannot 
accumulate  skill  as  a  computer  programmer without  a  computer.  Perhaps 
physical capital  will  assume  a  more  important role  when  the  technology  for 
accumulating human capital is better understood, but if so, it will be  at best a 
supporting part. Let us look elsewhere. 
In  the  framework  I  am  using,  the  other  possible  source  of  growth  rate 
differentials is differential rates of human capital accumulation, stemming from 
differences in societies' time-allocation decisions. But human capital takes many 
forms  and  its  accumulation  occurs  in  many ways,  so  there  are  decisions  in 
emphasis to be made here as well. The key choice,  I think, is whether to stress 
human capital accumulation at school, or on the job. 
If one interprets (2.3) or (2.5) as describing knowledge accumulation through 
schooling,  these  equations  imply that  doubling  the  fraction  in  school  would 
double the human capital growth rate, adding only another .02 to the average 
rate of .02. And, of course, the linearity of (2.3) probably leads to an overstate- 
ment of the effect of so large a change. As I remarked in my introduction, the 
fast growing Asian economies  are not, in general, better schooled than some of 
their  slow  growing neighbors.  Emphasis  on  formal schooling,  then,  seems  to 
involve  the  application  of  a  modest  multiplier  to  very  slight  differences  in 
behavior, leading to the same discouraging conclusion for human capital that I 
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This conclusion may seem an inappropriate inference from an oversimplified 
model, but I think it is in fact reinforced by thinking more seriously about the 
effects of schooling. Actual schooling decisions take place in a life-cycle context, 
with school preceding work and each individual deciding on the length of these 
two career phases. (This is a simplification, too, but a better one  than thinking 
of a representative agent dividing his time in perpetuity.) Now in a steady state 
or balanced path of  an economy in which everyone spends a fraction 1 -  u of 
his working life  in school, workers with schooling level  1 -  u are retiring from 
the labor force at exactly the same rate as new workers with the same education 
level are entering. No matter what the value of u is in such a steady state, all of 
this  investment  is  replacement  investment  and  there  is  no  increase  in  the 
average  skill  level  of  the  workforce.  Since  (2.3)  is  an  hypothesis  about  net 
investment,  one  cannot  then  identify  the  variable  1 -  u  with  time  spent  in 
school.  One  is  left  with  two  choices.  We  can  identify  increases  in  average 
schooling  levels with net  human capital investment.  Since schooling levels  are 
increasing in virtually all societies  today, this is a possibility worth developing, 
but it cannot be pursued within a steady state framework. This is an important 
and neglected  respect in which neither advanced nor most backward economies 
can be viewed as moving along balanced growth paths. 
Alternatively, we can think of a balanced path on which time spent in school 
is constant but the quality of schooling is improving due to increases in general 
knowledge.  This  possibility  is  analyzed  in  Stokey  (1991a),  from  which  the 
argument of the last paragraph is taken. In this paper, the rate of expansion of 
knowledge  is  taken  to  be  an  external  effect  of  the  time  spent  in  school,  the 
hypothesis that transforms a level effect into the needed  growth effect. But this 
hypothesis  does  not  salvage the  multiplier arguments I  applied  above, unless 
one is willing to assume that increases in general knowledge accrue equally from 
time  spent  in  primary  schools  and  universities.  To  quantify  a  model  like 
Stokey's, one would need  a much sharper empirical identification of the set of 
activities that lead to new knowledge-to  net investment in a society's human 
capital-than  is provided by any aggregate index of total  schooling time. This 
would be a most interesting avenue to explore but I am not prepared to do so 
here, so I will end this digression and move on. 
Human capital accumulation also occurs at work, as we know from the fact 
the  experienced  workers  and  managers  earn  more  than  inexperienced  ones. 
This aspect of human capital accumulation-on  the job training-could  also be 
(and  has  been)  modeled  as  a  time-allocation  decision.  Alternatively,  in  a 
multiple good world, one  could think of on the job accumulation-learning  by 
doing-as  associated with the  type of process  one  is engaged  in. That is, one 
might  think  of  some  activities  as  carrying with  them  a  high  rate  of  skill 
acquisition and others, routine or traditional ones, as associated with a low rate. 
If so, the mix of goods a society produces will affect its overall rate of human 
capital accumulation and growth. For understanding diversity, I think this route 
has  promise:  The  variation  across  societies,  or  at  least  those  engaged  in 
international trade, in the mix of goods produced is enormous. In this section, I MAKING  A  MIRACLE  259 
have  tried  to  motivate  a  focus  on  this  source  of  diversity by  a  process  of 
elimination: Neither physical capital accumulation nor human capital accumula- 
tion  through  schooling  seems  to  have  much  potential,  at  least  within  the 
framework I  have adopted.  In this next  section,  I turn to  much more  direct, 
microeconomic evidence on the same point. 
3.  THE  LIBERTY  SHIP  MIRACLE 
In Lucas (1988) I used a multi-good model, adapted from Krugman (1987), in 
which different goods were  associated with different learning rates to capture 
the idea that the choice of which goods to produce can be viewed as an implicit 
choice  of  a human capital accumulation rate.  In a world of  open  economies, 
comparative  advantage-previously  accumulated,  good-specific  human capital 
holdings-will  determine  who  produces what, and the  mix of  goods  that this 
process assigns to a particular economy will determine its rates of human capital 
growth. This  kind of  formulation  has been  taken  in  interesting  directions  by 
Boldrin  and  Scheinkman  (1988)  and  Matsuyama (1992).  It  is  attractive,  for 
present purposes, because there are such wide differences in product mix across 
countries and because  the fast growing Asian  economies  have undergone such 
dramatic changes in the goods they produce. 
But  the  hypothesis  that  different  goods  are  associated  with  permanently 
different  learning  potentials  conflicts  sharply with  available  evidence  in  two 
respects. First, examination of growth in total factor productivity (Solow residu- 
als) across both industries and time (as conducted,  for example, by Harberger 
(1990),  shows  no  decade-to-decade  stability  in  the  high  productivity growth 
industries. Lumber and wood products can rank 14th in the  1950's, first in the 
1960's, and disappear from the list of leaders altogether in the 1970's.9 Second, 
evidence  we  have  on  learning  on  narrowly defined  product  lines  invariably 
shows high initial learning rates, declining over time as production cumulates. 
These two kinds of evidence reinforce each other, and seem decisive against the 
formulation Krugman proposed. These observations have led Stokey (1988) and 
Young  (1991a) to  a very different formulation, one  that is much more  tightly 
grounded in microeconomic evidence. I will review this formulation in Section 4, 
but before  doing so I want to reinforce the motivation with a reminder of just 
how impressive the evidence on the productivity effects of learning by doing can 
be. 
The best evidence I know of that bears on on-the-job productivity change in a 
single, large scale production pro'cess,  was utilized in studies by Allan D. Searle 
(1945) and Leonard A.  Rapping (1965). Both studies used data on the produc- 
tion  of  a single type of  cargo vessel-the  Liberty Ship-in  14 U.S.  shipyards 
during World War II. From December,  1941, through December,  1944, these 
yards produced  a  total  of  2458  Liberty Ships,  all  to  the  same  standardized 
design. For several individual yards, Searle plotted man-hours per vessel against 
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FIGURE  1.-Reductions  in man-hours per vessel with increasing production. 
Merchant shipyards. 
number of vessels  completed  to date in that yard on log-log paper. His results 
for two yards are reproduced here as Figure 1. Average results over ten yards 
are given in Figure 2, along with results for three other vessel types. For Liberty 
Ships, "the reductions in manhours per ship with each doubling of cumulative 
output ranged from 12 to 24 percent."'10 
Stimulated  in  part  by  Kenneth  Arrow's (1961)  theoretical  suggestion  that 
learning-by-doing might serve as the key factor in growth for an economy as a 
whole,  Rapping incorporated Searle's and other evidence within a neoclassical 
production  framework.  He  pooled  the  data  for  all  yards  and  estimated  a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, controlling for changes in capital per yard, 
with  cumulated  yard  (not  industry) production  as  an  added  regressor.  He 
obtained estimates of the learning effect, comparable to Searle's, ranging from 
11 to  29 percent.  He  also  showed  that  the  inclusion  of  calendar time  added 
nothing (the trend came out slightly negative!) to these results. 
I do not  think there  is anything unique  to  shipbuilding in the  findings that 
Searle  and  Rapping  obtained.  The  Boston  Consulting  Group  (1972)  has  ob- 
tained  fairly clean  learning  curves, with  slopes  similar to  those  estimated  by 
Searle and Rapping, for a variety of industries, and other researchers have done 























































































1944. 262  ROBERT  E.  LUCAS,  JR. 
so  as well.  What is unique  about the  Liberty ship data is that the  ships were 
built according to exactly the same blueprints over a period of several years and 
that  data were  available yard by yard. Figure 2, which gives Searle's  learning 
curve for the industry as a whole, is not nearly as sharp as the curves in Figure 1 
for  individual yards, presumably because  industry expansion  is  a  mix  of  in- 
creased production by existing yards and the entry of new, inexperienced yards. 
Production data even  from narrowly defined  industries mask continual model 
and other product mix changes over time, which makes it difficult to use them to 
identify even strong learning effects. What is exceptional about the Liberty ship 
evidence,  I  think,  is  the  cleanness  of  the  experiment,  not  the  behavior  it 
documents so beautifully. 
Quantitatively,  these  results  are  interesting  to  an  economist  looking  for 
possible  sources  of  miracles. For the  three  year period  covered by Rapping's 
study,  industry output  per  manhour  increased  at  a  40  percent  annual  rate! 
There  is also considerable  ambiguity about what this evidence  means. Is it the 
individual worker who is doing the learning? The managers? The organization 
as a whole?  Are  the  skills being learned specific to the production process on 
which the learning takes place, or more general? Does  learning accrue solely to 
the individual worker, manager, or organization that does  the producing, or is 
some of it readily appropriable by outside  observers? These  are questions that 
the theory of growth needs to address, but I will pass over them here. 
A more urgent question, I think, is whether the kind of behavior Rapping and 
Searle documented,  for one product line for one brief period, can be linked to 
productivity growth for an entire economy over periods of thirty or forty years. 
This is the topic of the next section. 
4.  LEARNING  MODELS:  TECHNOLOGY 
In order to examine the possible connection between  evidence of learning on 
individual product  lines  and  productivity growth in  an  economy  as  a whole, 
consider the labor-only technology: 
(4.1)  x(t)  = kn(t)  z(t)  , 
where  x(t)  is the  rate of production of  a good,  k  is a productivity parameter 
that depends on the units in which labor input and output are measured, n(t)  is 
employment,  and  z(t)  represents  cumulative experience  in the  production of 
this good. Cumulative experience is in turn defined by the differential equation: 
(4.2)  dz(t)  = n(t)z(t)  a, 
dt 
and the initial value  z(to),  assumed to be greater than or equal to one,  of the 
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solution to (4.2) is 
]1/1- 
(4.3)  z(t)  =  (Z(tO))l'a  +  (1 -  a)ftn(u)  du 
The  implications  of  this  model  for  the  dynamics of  production  of  a  single 
good are familiar enough. Suppose, to take the simplest case, that employment 
is constant at n over time. Then (4.1) and (4.3) imply that production follows 
x(t)  = kn[ z(to) 1-a  + (1 -  a)n-(t -  to)|a1- 
Production grows without bound, and the rate of productivity growth declines 
monotonically  from  anh(z(to))a1  to  zero.  For  any  initial  productivity level 
z(to) > 1  and  any  employment  level  (or  path)  productivity at  date  t  is  an 
increasing function of the learning rate a. 
Notice that the technology (4.2) implies a scale effect: a link between the level 
of employment and the rate of growth of productivity. This carries the unwel- 
come  implication  that  a country like  India  should  have  an  enormous  growth 
advantage over a small country like Singapore. This is a feature of any learning 
by doing theory, but I agree with Matsuyama (1992) that if one is thinking about 
an entire economy or sizeable sector of an economy, it is a nuisance implication 
that we want to dispose of."  Matsuyama proposes thinking of a population as 
containing a fixed fraction of  entrepeneurs,  and of  a technology that requires 
that each enterprise be headed by one  of them. Then doubling the population 
means  doubling  the  number  of  enterprises  that  are  subject  to  the  learning 
technology, keeping the size of each fixed, and has no growth effects. Insofar as 
learning effects are partly external to the firm, as I think they are, this device 
doesn't  quite  work,  and  one  needs  to  think  of  some  other  limitation  on 
scale-city  size, say. I will simply ignore these scale economies  in what follows, 
assuming that some explanation along the lines of Matsuyama's will be discov- 
ered to rationalize this neglect. 
With the technology (4.1)-(4.3),  one can obviously obtain miraculous rates of 
productivity growth by  shifting  a  large  amount  of  labor  onto  a  single,  new 
product line. Provided that n(t -  to) is large relative to initial experience (which 
is the way most people  interpret statistical learning curves), the rate of produc- 
tivity growth t years after production is initiated is approximately a/((1  -  a)t). 
Using  the value  a = 0.2 estimated by Rapping and Searle, productivity growth 
one year after a product is introduced is a/(1  -  a) = 0.25. After two years, the 
growth rate is reduced by half to 0.125, and so on. A growth miracle sustained 
for a period of decades  clearly must thus involve the continual introduction of 
new goods, not merely continued learning on a fixed set of goods. Even if new 
goods are introduced, a shift of workers from old goods with low learning rates 
to new goods with high rates involves an initial drop in productivity: people  are 
11 Backus, Kehoe, and Kehoe (1991) is an empirical examination of scale effects on growth rates, 
formulated in a variety of ways. They find some evidence of such effects in manufacturing, and none 
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better at familiar activities than they are at novel ones. It is not even clear how 
these factors balance out. 
To pursue this question,  I follow Stokey (1988) and consider an economy in 
which  a variety of  goods,  indexed  by s,  is produced, where  a  higher index  s 
means a better good. In Stokey (1988) and, in different ways in Young (1991a) 
and Grossman and Helpman (1991b), specific assumptions on consumer prefer- 
ences or the technology give a precise meaning to the sense in which one good is 
better  than  another.  For  my  immediate  objectives,  it  will  be  adequate  to 
consider a small, open economy and to use an assumed schedule p(s,  t) = els  of 
world prices to  summarize the  quality of  goods: a better  good  means  a good 
with a higher price on world markets. Assume  that the economy progresses by 
introducing better  quality (higher s)  goods  into production over time,  and let 
S(t)  be  the  index of the  good that is first produced at date  t.  (I will also use 
r(s),  where  i  is the inverse function of the increasing function S, to denote the 
date on which good  s  is first produced.) Then if x(s,  t)  is production of good s 
at date  t,  the value of the economy's total production is 
(4.4)  y(t)  =  S(t) ePsx(s  t) ds. 
Let n(s, t) be employment on good s at t,  and z(s,  t)  be cumulated experience. 
Then if learning proceeds independently, good by good, (4.1) and (4.3) imply 
a/1  -a 
(4.5)  x(s,  t)  = kn(s,  t)  (z(s,Tr(s)))  1a+  (  a)  t  n(s,  u)duI 
Equations (4.4) and (4.5) together describe the implications for total production 
of a given way of allocating labor across product lines through time. 
Consider the following specific labor allocation. Let the rate of new product 
introduction  be  a  constant  A,  so  that  S(t)  =At  and  r(s)  =  s/A.  Let  SD  be  a 
density  function  with  cdf  iP, and  suppose  that  for  all  s E (0, At],  n(s, t)  = 
p(t -  s/A)  (that  (p(t -  s/A)  workers are assigned to produce the goods of age 
t -  s/A)  and that the remaining 1 -  ?P(t) workers produce a good 0 on which no 
learning occurs. Assume that initial productivity is the same for all goods, at the 
level  z(s/A,  s) = 6 > 1. Under these  assumptions, (4.4) and (4.5) imply that the 
value of total production is 
(4.6)  y(t)  =1-?P(t)  +kAetAtfeAu(u)[61-a+(1  a)P(u)]a/1-a  du 
The asymptotic growth rate for this economy is evidently /A.  This rate does not 
depend  either  on  the  learning  parameter  a  or  on  the  distribution  SD  of  the 
workforce over goods of  different vintages.  Changes in either  of  these  factors 
are simply level effects. To obtain sustained growth at all in this framework, it is 
necessary to assume that better goods become  producible at some exogenously 
given rate A, which then along with the quality gradient /i  dictates the long run 
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Though the production of new goods is continuously initiated in this example, 
the rate at which this occurs through time is fixed. In Stokey (1988) this rate is 
made endogenous  through the  assumption that the experience  accumulated in 
producing good  s reduces the cost of producing good s' > s. (It may reduce the 
cost of producing s' < s, too, but the spillover effect is assumed to be loaded in 
the  direction  of  improving productivity on  the  more  advanced  good.)  As  a 
specific instance of  Stokey's hypothesis, very close  to  that proposed by Young 
(1991a),  let  us  modify  the  last  example  by  postulating  that  the  initial  value 
z(s,  r(s))  in the  learning curve (4.3)  depends  on the  experience  that has been 
accumulated on  less  advanced goods.  Suppose  that an economy at some fixed 
date  t  has experience summarized by z(s,  t)  for s < S(t),  but has yet to produce 
any good with index above S(t).  Assume that if production of a good s > S(t)  is 
initiated at t (if r(s)  = t)  then its initial z-value is proportional to an average of 
the economy's experience on previously produced goods: 
s 
(4.7)  z(s,  7(s))  = 06|  e-'(S-U)z(u,  7(s))  du. 
Equation  (4.7)  expresses  the  initial  productivity on  good  s  as  an  average of 
experience  on  lower  quality  goods.  Equivalently,  we  can  express  the  initial 
productivity on the good introduced at t, good S(t),  as an average of experience 
on goods introduced earlier: 
(4.8)  z(S(t),  t)  =  0O8te-5[s(t)-s(t-v)]z(S(t  -  v),  t)S'(t  -  v) dv, 
0 
integrating over ages v instead of goods  s. 
Assume,  next,  that  production  on  a  new  good  is  initiated  whenever  the 
expressions (4.7) and (4.8) reach a trigger value  7  >  1, taken as a given constant. 
Under  this assumption, the  left  side  of (4.8)  is replaced with this constant  (, 
implying that the function S(t)  whose derivative is the rate at which new goods 
are introduced must satisfy 
(4.9)  6  05  te-5[S(t)-S(t-V)]z(S(t  -  v), t)S'(t  -v)  dv. 
As  in  the  previous  example,  we  continue  to  assume  that  the  allocation  of 
employment at any date is described by a density SD  and cdf  ',  where  ?P(u) is 
the fraction of people  employed producing goods that were introduced less than 
u years earlier. In the present case, each good has the initial productivity level 
(,  so inserting the solution (4.3). for z(S(t  -  v), t) with this initial value into (4.9) 
yields a single equation in the function  S(t).  For large values of  t,  the solution 
S(t)  to this equation will behave  like S(t)  = At, where the  constant  A satisfies 
(4.10)  =8 05Afe  -Av[-a  +  (1-  )cP(v)]1/l-  dv. 
The right side of (4.10) is just an average of the positive, increasing function 
0[f1-a  +  (1 -  a)P(v)]"1(1  -a),  taken with respect to  an exponential  distribution 
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toward the value  O0 as  8A  -*  oo and toward the value  0[f1a  + 1 -  a 1/(l-a)  as 
8A ->  0. (If the latter expression is less than  f  at A = 0, then the economy does 
not accumulate relevant experience fast enough to introduce new goods in the 
steady state.) For fixed 8A, the right side of (4.10) is an increasing function of 0, 
a,  and k, and it also increases as the distribution of labor sp(v) becomes more 
concentrated  on  lower  values  of  v  (on  newer  goods).  Hence  if  a  positive 
solution  A exists,  it  is  inversely  proportional  to  the  decay  rate  of  spillover 
experience, an increasing function of the spillover parameter 0 and the learning 
rate a,  and increases as employment is more heavily concentrated on goods that 
are closer to the economy's production frontier. 
The formula (4.6) for the value of total production continues to hold in this 
second example, and the economy's long run growth rate is A,u, as before. But 
under  this  second,  spillover,  technology,  economies  that  distribute  workers 
across goods of different ages in different ways will grow at different rates. Of 
course, this conclusion is not based purely on technological considerations: The 
value  (  of  initial  productivity  that  is  assumed  to  trigger  the  initiation  of 
production  of  a  new  good  is  of  central  importance,  and  needs  an  economic 
rationale. 
One might view the spillover technologies of Stokey and Young as reconciling 
the  Krugman hypothesis  of  a  manufacturing sector  with  a  constant  rate  of 
productivity growth, based  on  learning, with  the  fact  that  learning  rates  on 
individual production  processes  decline  over  time  to  zero.  For  example,  one 
could interpret either of the examples in this section as describing a sector of an 
economy with a positive  asymptotic rate of  productivity growth. On this view, 
the  contribution of  Stokey and Young  is to  break down an assumed sectoral 
learning rate into its components, a, 0, and 8 (in my notation), and to relate this 
rate to the way workers are distributed over goods of different vintages. 
This interpretation seems  fine to me  as long as one  is discussing the conse- 
quences of a  given workforce distribution, but if one  has in mind applying the 
theory  of  comparative  advantage  to  determining  the  way  workers  in  each 
country are allocated  to  the  production  of  different goods  it ceases  to  make 
sense.  In Krugman's theory (as in Lucas (1988)) it is a sector  as a whole that 
either has or does  not have a comparative advantage. In a sectoral interpreta- 
tion  of  Stokey and Young's  theories,  each  sector  consists of  many goods  and 
comparative advantage must be  determined  good by good. No  country can be 
expected to have a comparative advantage in manufacturing in general, or even 
in crude aggregates like Chemicals and Allied Products or Printing and Publish- 
ing. Comparative advantage wiil be associated with categories, like acetylene or 
paperback  editions  of  English  poetry,  that  are  invisible  even  in  the  finest 
industrial statistics. As  we  shall see  in the  next section,  this feature-besides 
being  a  step  towards greater  realism-leads  to  an  entirely  different view  of 
trade and growth than is implied by the  Krugman technology,  the  superficial 
similarity of the two notwithstanding. 
The main attraction of a learning spillover technology such as that described 
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for the  great difference  in productivity growth rates that are observed among 
low and middle income economies.  Of course, little is known about the crucial 
spillover parameters  a  and 0-on  which the learning curve evidence described 
in Section 3 provides no information-but  surely an essential first step is to find 
a formulation that is capable, under some  parameter values, of generating the 
behavior we are trying to explain. 
5.  LEARNING  AND  MARKET  EQUILIBRIUM 
The objective of the last section was to set down on paper a technology that is 
consistent  with a growth miracle, which is to  say, consistent  with wide  differ- 
ences in productivity growth among similarly endowed economies. This has been 
done, following Stokey and Young, in a way that I think is consistent with the 
main features of the East Asian miracles, all of which have involved sustained 
movement  of  the  workforce from less  to  more  sophisticated  products. A  fast 
growing  economy  or  sector  under  this  technology  is  one  that  succeeds  in 
concentrating its workforce on goods that are near its own quality frontier, and 
thus  in  accumulating human  capital  rapidly through  the  high  learning  rates 
associated with new activities and through the spillover of this experience to the 
production of still newer goods. These hypotheses are consistent with commonly 
known facts, and have testable  implications for many more. As yet, however, I 
have said nothing about the  economics  that determine  the  mix of  production 
activities in which an economy or sector of an economy in fact engages. 
The papers of  Stokey (1988), (1991b) and Young (1991a) develop models of 
market equilibrium with learning technologies  under the assumption the effects 
of learning are external-that  all human capital is a public good. In this case, 
labor is simply allocated to the use with the highest current return, independent 
of  learning rates. With the  constant returns technology these  authors assume, 
the competitive equilibrium is Ricardian and straightforward to calculate. This 
is the simplest case, so I will begin with it too. 
In such a setting,  Stokey (1991b), studies  north-south trade, where  "north" 
means relatively well-endowed  with human capital. Under specific assumptions 
about  consumer  preferences  for  goods  of  different  qualities,  she  obtains  a 
unique world equilibrium in which the south produces an interval of low quality 
goods,  the  north produces  an  interval of  high quality goods,  and there  is  an 
intermediate range of goods that are produced in neither place. With free trade 
(as  opposed  to  autarky) learning-by-doing is  depressed  in  the  poor  country, 
which  now  imports high-quality goods  from the  rich country rather than  at- 
tempting to produce them at home. One can see that with dynamics as assumed 
in  Stokey (1988),  both  countries  will  enjoy growth but  the  poor  country will 
remain forever poorer. 
A similar equilibrium is characterized in Young (1991a), using a parameteri- 
zation  of  preferences  and  the  learning  technology  that  permits  the  explicit 
calculation  of  the  north-south  equilibrium, including a full  description of  the 
equilibrium dynamics. There  are many possible  equilibrium evolutions  of  his 268  ROBERT  E.  LUCAS,  JR. 
north-south system, depending  on  the  populations  of  the  two regions  and on 
their  relative  human  capital  holdings  at  the  time  trade  is  initiated.  As  in 
Stokey's (1991b) analysis, the advanced country produces high quality goods and 
the  poor  country produces  low  quality goods.  Free  trade  slows  learning  and 
growth in the poor country and speeds it in the rich one. In Young's framework, 
there are equilibria in which the poor catch up to the rich, but only when their 
larger population  lets  them  enjoy  greater  scale  economies.  Young  does  not 
emphasize this possibility and, as I have said earlier, I do not wish to either. 
The  equilibria of Stokey and Young, then,  involve sustained growth of both 
rich  and  poor,  at  possibly  different  rates,  and  the  continuous  shifting  of 
production  of  goods  introduced  in the  north to  the  lower wage  south.  Initial 
comparative advantage is not permanent, as in Krugman's formulation, since a 
rich country's experience  in producing any given good will eventually be offset 
by the fact that the good can be produced more cheaply in a less experienced 
but  lower  wage  environment.  Yet  there  are  no  growth  miracles  in  these 
theories.  Though  these  equilibria could  readily be  modified  to  include  cross- 
country  external  effects,  and  hence  catching  up  (for  reasons  unrelated  to 
economies  of  scale),  as  I  have  done  with  the  Solow  model,  there  would  be 
nothing one would wish to call miraculous about this process. 
In the models of Stokey and Young, all human capital benefits are assumed to 
be external. The learning and growth that occurs is always, in a sense, acciden- 
tal. Other models contain aspects of privately held knowledge, so that individual 
agents face  the  capital-theoretic  problem of  balancing current returns against 
the  future  benefits  of  learning  of  some  kind.  Matsuyama  (1991)  studies  a 
two-sector system in which workers compare the present value of earnings in a 
traditional sector  to  the value  of  earnings in a manufacturing sector in which 
production  is subject to  external increasing returns. Young  (1991b)  augments 
learning with a research activity that yields patentable new products. Grossman 
and Helpman (1991a) postulate  two R and D activities-innovation,  done only 
in advanced economies,  and imitation, done by poor economies  too-with  lags 
that let  the  discoverer or successful low-cost imitator enjoy a period of super- 
normal profits in a Bertrand-type equilibrium. Whether one  calls the  decision 
problems  that  arise  in  these  analyses  occupational  choice,  or  research  and 
development, or learning, all involve a decision on the allocation of time-at-work 
that involves balancing current returns against the benefits of increased future 
earnings, and all have a similar capital-theoretic structure. 
Dropping the assumption that learning has external effects only is certainly a 
step toward realism, one that raises many interesting theoretical possibilities yet 
to  be  explored.  It  is  thus  only  conjecture,  but  I  would  guess  that  the  main 
features of the equilibria that have been worked out by Stokey and Young will 
turn out to stand up very well under different assumptions about the ownership, 
if I can use  that term, of  human capital. A  learning spillover technology gives 
those  who  operate  near  the  current  goods  frontier  a  definite  advantage  in 
moving beyond it. This advantage is decisive when  decisions  are taken myopi- 
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so are internalized and workers and firms look to the future in their individual 
decision problems. 
In  short, available general  equilibrium models  of  north-south  trade do  not 
predict miraculous economic  growth for the  poor countries taken as a group, 
nor do I see any reason to expect that the equilibria of more elaborate theories 
will have this feature. This is a disappointment, perhaps, but it does not seem to 
me to be  a deficiency of these  models. These  are theories  designed to capture 
the  main interactions between  the  advanced economies  taken as a group and 
the  backward economies  as  a whole,  within  a  two-country world  equilibrium 
framework. Since it is a fact that the poor are either not gaining on the rich or 
are gaining only very slowly, one wants a theory that does not predict otherwise. 
A successful theory of economic miracles should, I think, offer the possibility 
of  rapid growth episodes,  but  should  not  imply their occurrence  as  a  simple 
consequence  of  relative  backwardness.  It  should  be  as  consistent  with  the 
Philippine experience  as with the  Korean. For the purpose of exploring these 
possibilities,  the  conventions  of  small,  open  economy  trade  theory  are  more 
suitable  (as  well  as  simpler  to  apply) than  those  of  the  theory  of  a  closed, 
two-country system. If the technology available to individual agents facing world 
prices has constant returns, then anything is possible. Some allocations will yield 
high  external benefits  and  growth in  production  and wages;  others  will  not. 
There will be a large number of possibilities, with individual agents in equilib- 
rium indifferent between  courses of action that have very different aggregative 
consequences.  Theoretically,  one  can  shut  off  some  of  these  possibilities  by 
introducing diminishing returns in the right places, but I am not sure that these 
multiplicities should be viewed as theoretical  defects,  to be patched up. If our 
objective is to understand a world in which similarly situated economies  follow 
very different  paths,  these  theoretical  features  are  advantageous. A  constant 
returns (at the level of individual producing units) learning spillover technology 
is  equally  consistent  with  fast  and  slow  growth. If  our  task is  to  understand 
diversity, this is an essential feature, not a deficiency. 
A second attraction of the learning spillover technology is that it is consistent 
with the  strong connection  we  observe between  rapid productivity growth and 
trade or openness.  Consider two small economies  facing the same world prices 
and similarly endowed,  like Korea  and the  Philippines  in  1960. Suppose  that 
Korea somehow shifts its workforce onto the production of goods not formerly 
produced  there,  and  continues  to  do  so,  while  the  Philippines  continues  to 
produce its traditional goods. Then  according to the  learning spillover theory, 
Korean production will grow more rapidly. But in 1960, Korean and Philippine 
incomes were about the same, so the mix of goods their consumers demanded 
was about the same. For this scenario to be possible, Korea needed  to open up 
a large difference between the mix of goods produced and the mix consumed, a 
difference that could widen over time. Thus a large volume of trade is essential 
to a learning-based growth episode. 
One can use the same reasoning to see why import-substitution policies  fail, 
despite what can initially appear to be success in stimulating growth. Consider 270  ROBERT  E.  LUCAS,  JR. 
an economy that exports, say, agricultural products and imports most manufac- 
tured  goods.  If  this  economy  shifts  toward autarky through  tariff and  other 
barriers, its workforce will shift to formerly imported goods and rapid learning 
will occur. But this is a one-time stimulus to productivity, and thereafter the mix 
of goods produced in this closed system can change only slowly, as the consump- 
tion  mix changes.  Note  that  this  argument has  to  do  only with  the  pace  of 
change  in an economy's production mix and .does  not  involve scale,  though it 
can obviously be reinforced by scale economies. 
I  do  not  intend  these  conjectures  about  the  implications  of  a  learning 
spillover  technology  for  small  countries  facing  given  world  prices  to  be  a 
substitute for the  actual construction of  such a theory. To  do this, one  would 
need to take a realistic position on these  issues touched on in my discussion of 
Rapping's  and  Searle's  evidence.  What  is  the  nature  of  the  human  capital 
accumulation  decision  problems  faced  by workers, capitalists,  and managers? 
What  are  the  external consequences  of  the  decisions  they  take?  The  papers 
cited here consider a variety of possible assumptions on these  economic issues, 
but it must be  said that little  is known, and without  such knowledge  there  is 
little we can say about the way policies that affect incentives can be expected to 
influence economic growth. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
I began by asking what current economic theory has to say about the growth 
miracles of East Asia.  The  recent literature on which I have drawn to answer 
this question is fragmentary, and my survey of it more fragmentary still. Even so, 
the  image of  the  growth process  and the  role of  these  remarkable economies 
within this process  that emerges  is, I think, surprisingly sharp, certainly com- 
pared to what could have been said on this subject ten years ago. I will conclude 
by summarizing it. 
The main engine of growth is the accumulation of human capital-of  knowl- 
edge-and  the main source of differences in living standards among nations is 
differences  in human capital.  Physical capital  accumulation plays an essential 
but  decidedly  subsidiary  role.  Human  capital  accumulation  takes  place  in 
schools,  in research organizations,  and in the  course  of  producing goods  and 
engaging  in  trade.  Little  is  known  about  the  relative  importance  of  these 
different modes  of  accumulation, but for understanding periods  of very rapid 
growth in a single  economy,  learning on  the job seems  to be  by far the  most 
central.  For  such  learning  to  occur  on  a  sustained  basis,  it  is  necessary  that 
workers  and  managers  continue  to  take  on  tasks  that  are  new  to  them,  to 
continue  to  move up what  Grossman and Helpman  call the  "quality ladder." 
For this to be done on a large scale, the economy must be a large scale exporter. 
This picture has the virtue of being consistent with the recent experience  of 
both the  Philippines  and Korea. It would be  equally consistent with post-1960 
history with the  roles  of  these  two economies  switched. It is a picture that is 
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producing a very different mix of goods from the mix it consumes.  It does  not 
appear to be  consistent  with the  third world as a whole  beginning to  grow at 
East  Asian  rates:  There  is  a  zero-sum  aspect,  with  inevitable  mercantilist 
overtones, to productivity growth fueled by learning by doing. 
Can these  two paragraphs be viewed as a summary of things that are known 
about  economic  growth? After  all,  they  are  simply a  sketch  of  some  of  the 
properties  of  mathematical  models,  purely  fictional  worlds,  that  certain 
economists  have invented.  How  does  one  acquire knowledge  about  reality by 
working in one's office with pen and paper? There is more to it, of course: Some 
of the numbers I have cited are products of decades-long research projects, and 
all of  the  models  I have reviewed have sharp implications that could be,  and 
have  not  been,  compared  to  observation.  Even  so,  I  think  this  inventive, 
model-building  process  we  are  engaged  in  is  an  essential  one,  and  I  cannot 
imagine  how we  could  possibly  organize  and  make  use  of  the  mass  of  data 
available to us without it. If we understand the process of economic growth-or 
of anything else-we  ought to be capable of demonstrating this knowledge by 
creating  it  in  these  pen  and  paper  (and  computer-equipped)  laboratories  of 
ours. If we know what an economic miracle is, we ought to be able to make one. 
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